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Abstract: The paper provides a brief, admittedly subjective and critical overview of the four major theories on 
public administration as they have appeared (or not) in Central and Eastern Europe. “Bureaucracy” is discussed 
in greater detail. Adding to the general belief that it was the communist regime with its politicized personnel 
policy that prevented the formation of a full-fledged bureaucracy, the paper emphasizes that there are other, 
long-term impediments in the region as well. Heydays of NPM and the transition from the communist past 
appeared parallel in the region. The gap between the communist system and NPM ideal could hardly be wider; 
simplistically: the former resisting the latter preferring anything that is “private” and “market”. The gap was 
perhaps too large to successfully bridge. Good Governance and Neo-Weberan State is widely discussed among 
researchers of the region. However, one can hardly identify such solutions in practice in CEE.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The title of this book explicitly refers to at least two major contemporary paradigms – if we may call these 
paradigms – namely: (Good) Governance and the Neo-Weberian state. At the same time, the title implicitly 
refers also to the classical public administration paradigm that, so far, has been captured best by Max Weber’s 
bureaucratic theory. And what is in between? That is New Public Management (NPM) a paradigm or rather the 
Zeitgeist between the early eighties and the Great Depression II. of 2008.  
 
In brief, our book title – referring to the main theme of the 22nd Conference of NISPAcee – would evoke not less 
than an overview of all major contemporary administrative models, specifically in a Central-East European 
(CEE) perspective. Questions like feasibility of these approaches in the CEE countries and expected – or in some 
cases like NPM or Weberianism already experienced – value are raised by this title.  
 
This short concluding chapter is an attempt to have a look at on all the four approaches. Bureaucracy is discussed 
in somewhat more detail. Fist an outline reconstructing the Weberian model is provided and then some sources 
of the flawed nature of bureaucracies in CEE are reviewed,  referring the shorter run (that is the communist 
decades) and the longer run historical sources of these defective administrative arrangements. A brief section is 
devoted to the transition of the early nineties.
2
 In the next three sections an overview of New Public 
Management, Good Governance and Neo-Weberian State is provided as they have occurred in the CEE region.  
 
2. Bureaucracy 
 
2.1. Weberian bureaucracy  
 
Weber describes bureaucracy in a general historical context as a crucial part, or manifestation of the process of 
rationalization (Weber, 1958: Foreword). He describes bureaucratic organizations at two points of his seminal 
work (Weber, 1978):  
 In Volume I, Chapter III. he briefly sums up the characteristic features of bureaucratic organization and 
the specific position of bureaucrat under the title: “Legal Authority With a Bureaucratic Administrative 
Staff”; 
 In Volume II, Chapter XI, under the title “Bureaucracy”, Weber goes to greater detail in analyzing the 
individual features of bureaucracy, and shows how the modern form of bureaucracy differs from 
historically earlier forms of administrative organizations. 
 
Four attributes seem to dominate the studies of authors who later interpreted Weber’s theory: 
                                                          
1 Gy. Gajduschek is an Associate Professor at the Corvinus University, Budapest and senior researcher of the Social Sciences 
Research Center, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.  
2 The fact that these countries are frequently named as „transition countries” after a quater century indicates that the transition 
may not be really successful.  
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1. Specialization and/or division of labor; 
2. Expertise (well trained personnel with significant job experience); 
3. Rules, which define structures, procedures, employment and individual responsibilities, and 
4. Hierarchy. 
 
It is generally accepted that specialization and division of labor directly lead to increased productivity. Expertise, 
knowledge of how to deal adequately with issues at hand, has a similar effect. Rules may describe and enforce 
the “one best way” of handling cases, thus, they may also greatly contribute to increased efficiency. Hierarchy, 
however, appears mostly not as a feature that directly contributes to efficiency. Hierarchy in this context is only 
a reaction to division of labor, which requires co-ordination in the organization. Above their primary function in 
directly increasing efficiency, rules may also serve as a tool of co-ordination (Khandalla, 1997). The “position of 
the bureaucrat” is basically a description of the merit based civil service system.  
 
Weber’s theory in the Anglo-Saxon World was interpreted as a theory of the most efficient organizational form. 
However, it can be argued that most if not all bureaucratic features serve another crucial outcome: reduction of 
uncertainty. Whereas doubt have been raised in organization studies, economics and NPM about the efficiency 
of bureaucratic arrangement, its superiority to assure predictability and certainty has not been seriously 
questioned (Gajduschek, 2003; Roman, 2014).
 3
 One may argue that this is exactly the reason why bureaucracies 
seem to be so appropriate for some, even is not for all, administrative functions (most of all, applying laws; 
Radford, 1988). 
 
2.2. CEE bureaucracy – the Communist heritage 
 
Was the public administration organized in a bureaucratic way in the communist countries? According to the 
majority of researchers: certainly not. Most importantly, administrative staff was selected, promoted or even 
laid-off on political basis, rather than on merit. This statement occurred in the post-transition scholarly literature 
(Verheijen, 1999: 4; Nunberg, 1999) and appeared in the critique and expectations of European Union in the 
accession process (Meyer-Sahling 2009a).
 4
 Another, typically mentioned critique is the missing capacity of 
assisting policy decisions (Goetz-Wollmann, 2001). This weakness, just as several others, like fragmentation, the 
inability to act in a coordinated way (Verheijen, 1999: 2-3; Nunberg 1999: 238-240; Meyer-Sahling, 2009) stem 
from the ‘division of powers’ between the administration and the party structures, most of all the central party 
apparatus. In this arrangement the administration was responsible solely for accurately implementing the 
‘policies’ formulated by the Communist Party’s Central Committee in form of orders or in better cases as public 
laws. This fact may still be present in the ultimately law-enforcement oriented style (instead of service style) of 
administrative activities (Kovac 2013/14),
 
as well as the preponderance of politics and the weakness of 
(administrative) expertise in policy making. 
 
2.3. CEE bureaucracy – from a longer historical perspective 
 
Kulcsár (2001) analyses the problem of deviant bureaucracies in a wider perspective of modernization and semi-
periphery position.
5
 He relies on these flows of thoughts as a starting point to describe the CEE region. In this 
view, socialism is not so much a cause of a specific governmental-administrative arrangement (i.e. deviant 
bureaucracy) but both of these are consequences of a wider phenomenon: the semi-peripheral status and its 
consequences, among others the continuous strive to reach the center and a permanent inability to succeed.  
 
The special circumstances are the major causes of anomalous bureaucracy. Causes include the highly limited 
resources available for government, which is in sharp contrast with the relatively high and highly diverse 
                                                          
3 One has to keep in mind that the state bureaucracies were originally ‘designed’ most of all to execute laws. And the ultimate 
value of law in a civil law system is: certainty (Merryman & Pérez-Perdomo, 2007). Certainty is also the basis of equity.  
4 Meyer-Sahling (2009), as an excellent expert of the region, warns against oversimplification. Indeed, for instance in 
Hungary, the principle of political loyalty gradually gave way to expertise, followed by a gradual, but in few decades radical, 
change in the composition of civil service. The transition, in fact, led to a measurable drop in professional capacity 
(Gajduschek, 2007). 
5 Kulcsár (2001) uses these two theoreties as strongly interrelated, whereas in the literature these concepts are discussed 
surprisingly independently from one another. For modernization, see publications of Fred Riggs from the 60-70-ies and 
somewhat later LaPalombara (see an overview of Development administration in Riggs, 1971; a more updated approach in 
Heady, 2001). On the problem of semi-periphery, a lot has been written since Wallerstein (1974) published his seminal work 
on the center-periphery divide, its causes and consequences. From the point of view of CEE, Sztompka (1993), from the early 
years of transition, seems to be especially revealing. 
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expectations of the society.
6
 Another major set of causes is the general culture, and value systems. We 
emphasize two major streams of deviancies by interpreting of and perhaps elaborating on Kulcsár’s thought here. 
 
First, tasks and objectives set up for the administration are clearly impossible to carry out. Most of all, these 
tasks are overly ambitious as they intend to bridge the enormous gap between people’s and/or political leaders’ 
expectations, on one hand, and the available resources, on the other. Kulcsár refers to the shortage and to the 
lower level of economic performance (i.e. GDP). In this arrangement laws – that are otherwise considered as a 
major (or sole) policy instrument – are ineffective (Kulcsár, 2001: 943, 950): 
 
The Western model necessarily leads to dysfunctional results because it does not suit these transitory 
societies, where the promulgated legal norms frequently hardly mean more than pious wishes ...; 
7
 
 
As the violation of legal norms also becomes a practically general feature, the administrator has a 
chance to identify the violation of law discretionally, more precisely for calling the ‘chosen’ violator to 
account, usually not because of the concrete violation of law, but by referring to it.  
 
This in turn increases the power-element of administration as administrators are not so much subordinated to the 
rule but generate the rules themselves: “... calculable legality is pushed behind the discretion of the official...” 
which in turn reinforces “... the traditional attitude that administration is an exercise of privilege rather than a 
matter of skill and training” (Kulcsár, 2001: 945-946). This suppressive attitude is exacerbated by the fact that 
the government, manifested typically in its administrators, is the key actor of development. This view is 
expressed and reinforced by the communist ideology.  
 
Another stream of argument refers to the specific culture and attitude of the population in these countries. This 
attitude accepts the suppressive character of government as it has been a historical experience. In most countries 
“foreign-alien” powers provided government (e.g. the Habsburgs for Hungary, and the Hungarians for large part 
of the present Slovakia, Romania and Serbia; before that: Turks in most of these countries). Alienation and the 
lack of trust is a long-standing historical tradition, still present in these countries, as it can well be seen from 
European Social Survey data (Giczy-Sík, 2009). This attitude accepts the unfair, oppressive behavior of 
government bureaucracy but continuously searches for “personal treatment”, curbing the laws, favoritism and is 
open to corruption if necessary (Sajó, 1985; Kurkchiyan, 2011). 
 
Our main statements in brief: the administration of the pre-1990 period could not be Weberian bureaucracies due 
to (a) political reasons related to the socialist-communist regime but also for (b) reasons that are far more 
overarching in terms of time, territory and rationale than the historically short impact of the communist regime.  
 
3. The challenge of transition 
 
Large, some would argue, unprecedented change took place in a short period of time, in the region around 1990. 
Claus Offe’s (1997: 34) term, the “triple transition” is frequently quoted in this regard, though the meaning of 
this term has somewhat changed from the original. These days we typically mean the change of economic 
system from planned economy and the dominance of state ownership to a competitive market characterized by 
private ownership; from a dictatorship to a democratic political system, which was in several cases accompanied 
by the establishment (or reestablishment) of an independent state, setting up new government structures.  
In fact each of the three elements has a direct impact on the executive arrangement and the functioning of 
administration. As Bouckaert (2009: 96, 101) notes:  
 
Within the CEE countries, it seems that changes have been drastic indeed, including in public systems. 
Politics, policies and administrations were to change accordingly.  
 
Reforming the public sector sometimes was indispensable and impossible at the same time, and 
therefore highly problematic. Importing NPM techniques that needed to improve Weberian 
bureaucracies when these were not present and simultaneously building classical checks and balances 
was a tough reality. Reforming in such a case sometimes was organising dysfunctions.  
 
Putting now particular cases of state-building aside, the new political-constitutional arrangement, with the rule of 
law meant, among several others, that the “Lord”, the political top of the executive, has not been as stable and to 
                                                          
6 High, as expectations are influenced by Western ideals, and diverse due to the prismatic society (Riggs & MacKean, 1964). 
7 This statement echoes in the contemporary literature on compliance of CEE states with EU laws (e.g. Falkner-Trieb, 2008; 
Sedelmeier, 2011). 
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a great extent certain and predictable as it was before. Elections resulted in – to use Meyer-Sahling’s concept 
(2009a: 84) – “frequent, wholesale government changes”, that changes between opposite sides of a highly 
polarized ideological spectrum, typically denying mostly everything the previous government has done, let alone 
laying off most of the senior civil servants serving the previous Cabinet. In brief, the political environment may 
provide orders but certainly not clear and stable guidance to the administration.  
 
The relationship of the administration and the society, or individual citizens (clients) has changed just as much as 
the administration-politics connection. The rule of law disqualified most of the methods, techniques used and 
arrangements relied on by the administration earlier. When, in the communist rule, the whole society was 
organized in a hierarchical – one may say, somewhat bureaucratic – array, the administration may have issued 
directives to almost anyone, from (state owned) company CEOs, to cooperatives, associations or unions and 
even to individual citizens. Even if those orders were not based explicitly on laws, they were followed for fear of 
– official or unofficial – vengeance. The administration could collect and store information practically on 
anything.  
 
The emergence of the rule of law has changed this situation as the new constitutional rules were adopted. 
Methods that were practiced as routines became useless (treated even as severe misconduct) and there were no 
others at hand. Laws may be changed in a civil law system from a day to the next, but a large organization, its 
practices, as we all know from organization studies, is much more difficult to change and that takes a lot of 
time.
8
 In brief, within a period of one-two years the administration faced a large set of challenges, which in other 
countries occurred and were gradually solved throughout a century or more. Naturally the administration could 
not cope with these challenges.
9
  
 
The transformation of the economy has just increased the burden and confusion. The below table is based on the 
IMF website on “General government total expenditure”  data.10 Data are presented in three groups with group 
averages.  
 
Table 1 General government total expenditure as Percent of GDP, grouped by country type by the author  
CEE countries % West-European 
countries  
% “NPM countries” % 
Bulgaria 38,1 Austria 51,9 Australia 34,7 
Hungary 49,1 Finland 47,0 New Zealand 34,9 
Lithuania 36,0 France 51,1 United Kingdom 34,0 
Poland 41,1 Germany 45,1 United States NA 
Romania 35,0 Greece 46,7   
Slovak Republic 52,1 Ireland 30,6   
Slovenia 40,8 Italy 49,0   
Latvia 37,0 Netherlands 41,6   
Estonia 36,1 Portugal 41,6   
Group average 39,8 Group average 45,0 Group average 34,5 
 
Looking at these data one should have in mind that the planned economy is based on the collective that is 
government ownership of “means of production”; even apartments were owned by the government; almost 
                                                          
8 The statute on the protection of personal data adopted in 1992 in Hungary, designed by legal scholars, was considered more 
stringent in defending privacy than those of such well-established democracies as the US or UK. Government databases 
could not be used for most administrative activities that they previously served. This one decision jeopardized whole sectors 
of government for over a decade. E.g. the tax authority could not trace if one officially earning the minimum wage has luxury 
cars and luxurious real estates (though official registries exist on these properties at other government offices). Similarly, real 
estates may be sold with forged documents as the real estate registry offices could not inform the owners as they were denied 
access to address-registry available at another agency.  
9 According to statistics of Hungarian Tax Authority, 1448 tax fraud cases initiated by the authority were pending at courts in 
1992, 3853 in 1995 and 23861 in 1998. It is not the number of tax frauds (which, throughout this period, might have been 
well over a million annually) but the capacity of the Authority has increased, as it gradually learnt more effective inspection 
methods in the changed legal environment (Semjén et al., 2001: 105). 
10 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/weoselgr.aspx No data on any CEE country are available before 
1995. By 2000 most countries of the region appear in the database. It is worth mentioning that most countries of former 
Soviet-Union are characterized by an even lower government spending: Ukraine is exceptionally high with its 49,0%; Russia 
38,0%, Kirgizstan 36,4%, Georgia 33%;  Kazakhstan 22,5.  
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everyone received her salary from the government as companies were state-owned and private employment was 
exceptional.
11
 To put it somewhat sharply, the baseline for the data in the table for CEE countries is close to 
100% about a decade earlier. Within a decade, government presence in the society dropped to a level that in 
some countries fall below leading NPM countries. The enormous changes are highlighted by the EBRD (1994: 
12): “In 1993, the private share of output rose in the countries of Eastern Europe by 10-40 percentage points”. In 
other words, in most transition countries more assets were privatized in 1993, one year, then presumably in most 
leading NPM countries in two decades. Probably never in history, including revolutions, such large-scale 
privatization and such large-scale change in government size, functions and methods in such a short period of 
time took place.  
 
Administrative consequences of this enormous change are easy to identify. Large number of administrative 
instruments based on government ownership (e.g. an owner may give orders to chiefs executives) has 
disappeared. The majority of administrative techniques the new economy required (from controlling financial 
activities and securities to consumer right protection and tax collection and unemployment services
12
) had no 
antecedent in the previous system, and there was no well trained personnel to carry out these activities. There 
was no appropriate personnel to carry out the large-scale privatization and there was no effective, let alone 
accountable and transparent control mechanism that could have assured that the process takes place in an 
uncorrupted manner. Most countries sold their assets in bulk, roughly the same time, enormously increasing the 
supply. Meanwhile – due to the lack of time to generate capital – there was no endogenous demand. Due to these 
facts, most government owned, that is by this time: national assets were sold well below their real value.
 13
 (This 
is most evident in case of natural resources like oil and gas fields in post-Soviet countries.) This trajectory may 
have inevitably led to the spread of mafia-capitalism (the term was used first by Várese, 1994). 
 
In brief, the transition meant the reduction of the state, most of all in terms of size of controlled areas as well as 
the means of control. The role of government was to be reduced largely in economy as well as in citizens’ 
everyday life. This was a shocking change to be managed or – more realistically – to undergo and endure.  
 
4. The NPM in CEE – deepening the crises 
 
The above described – crisis – situation was largely aggravated by New Public Management (NPM). The two hit 
transition countries jointly. NPM worsened the situation as made the target much further away, thus the 
incredibly wide canyon to bridge much wider. It was not, say, a Scandinavian, active welfare state the goal 
anymore, with its roughly 50% of government spending (state-run services, a wide range of public companies) 
but a country like the US. In the author’s view, this may have been a root problem with NPM in the region.  
Others, like the dangers of the “let managers manage” idea in the given cultural and institutional arrangement 
without clear accountability lines and institutions, the lack of transparency; or the involvement of freshly 
established, weakly (if at all) capitalized, and thus perfectly unreliable market players, into public service 
provision, etc. may be just the tip of an iceberg. 
 
Local and foreign analysts called attention to the dangers of NPM in this highly different environment as early as 
the mid-nineties (e.g. Verheijen-Dimitrova 1996; Hesse 1998). Their voice, however, was lost in the storm of 
NPM, highly amplified by such international organizations as the above mentioned IMF, and WB or OECD 
making their financial assistance dependent on applying NPM measures to an extent not applied in any of the 
Western countries
14
, certainly not in such a short period of time.  
 
At first glance the evaluation of NPM in the region is somewhat contradicting. Some, like Goetz (2001: 1035) 
argue that the core of NPM, that is, in his interpretation managerial (as opposed to legal) approach, could not 
become deeply rooted in the Eastern soil, so hardly had a major impact. Others – like Verheijen-Dimitrova 
(1996) and van der Berg et al. (2002) - warn about the negative impact of NPM in the region. Again others like 
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 According to the 1980 census data there were 138 thousand persons, about 2,7% of total employment, employed in private 
sector in Hungary, perhaps the most ‘liberal’ regime in the ‘Soviet block’. 
http://konyvtar.ksh.hu/neda/a111126.htm?v=pdf&a=pdfdata&id=KSH_Nepszamlalas_1980_22_01&pg=0&lang=hun#pg=10
&zoom=f&l=s  
12
 As the unemployment rate jumped from zero to around ten percent or above in a few years period.  
13 Stiglitz (2003) provides an excellent analysis of this process and its depressing consequences, referring also the crucial role 
of neo-liberal, pro-free-market ideology and its belligerent spreading by such international organizations as IMF. Van der 
Berg et al. (2002) provide an intelligent comparative and critical assessment regarding the transition of public administration 
in this regard.  
14
 Especially not in Continental European countries like France and Germany (Pollitt-Bouckaert 2011: 117) that has been 
traditionally provided model of PA for most countries of the region.   
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Drechsler (e.g. 2005: 101-103) strongly criticize NPM generally as well as specifically in the region, from a 
rather theoretical perspective providing an extensive overview of the relevant critical literature. There are a 
surprisingly small number of studies attempting to empirically assess the impact of NPM in the region.
15
  
 
Some argue, somewhat surprisingly to the author, that foreign ‘advice’ addressed rather the reinstatement of 
classical Weberian bureaucracy.
16
 Most authors, however, agree that the foreign pressure was directed towards 
neo-liberal values, promoting NPM in the field of government, especially throughout the first and crucial decade 
of transition.  
 
 
5. The notion of Good Governance (GG) 
 
The roots of Good Governance are somewhat difficult to trace back. One root is certainly that of the large stream 
of Governance literature. (E.g. Kooiman 1993, Klijn 1996, Pierre 2000, Salamon 2002, Sorensen-Torfing 2007, 
Bevir-Richards 2009, Poulsen 2009, Bevir 2011). Governance literature conceptualizes a situation, in which the 
government is not in a position to direct and manage society alone, but networks (policy communities) are 
formed, more or less spontaneously, around policy issues from various types of stakeholders possessing various 
resources. Another stream is the notion of Neo-Weberain State (see below). The term referred originally
17
 to the 
particular way most of the Continental European countries reacted to the NPM. A third source is “Good 
Governance” as a term advocated by major international organizations as the appropriate way to organize 
government – in Non-Western World. The concept occurred first in the vocabulary of United Nations’ 
development activities (see: UN ESCAP), later in WB documents in 1992, and IMF in 1996. However, for long, 
only the UN documents emphasized the importance of participation, consultation, transparency and the rule of 
law on the same or higher level than administrative and service efficiency. In case of the WB and especially IMF 
it occurred as a somewhat modified version of NPM with the above mentioned elements being rather a 
democratic façade covering the harsh pro-market approach.  
Only in the third stream can be interpreted as a normative approach,  that is well expressed by adding the “good” 
to the term. Though the roots are different, by now there is a relative agreement on the basic features of this 
approach. Polona Kovac in the introduction of this volume sums up the major principles – in presumably the 
order of importance as follows: “Participation, transparency, legal certainty, responsiveness, accountability, 
efficiency”.  
 
So far too short period has passed to evaluate the impact of this approach. In fact, only a few reform attempts 
have been made in the region that reflect to the Good Governance model. NISPAcee recently published a book 
titled: “On the path to Good Governance in CEE …” (Kovač, 2014) The book is an excellent selection of young 
academics’ papers from V4 countries. However, most phenomena addressed in the studies refer to NPM rather 
than GG approach. Those that address GG do that typically in comparison to NPM (e.g. PA curricula content, or 
management techniques of mayors). One may identify perhaps two out of eleven contributions dealing 
specifically with Good Governance (Cieciora 2014, Kiss 2014). The first referring to the practices of a Polish 
city, the second of Slovak municipal housing (trying actually to manage a ‘wicked problem’ caused by the 
wholesale sale of apartments in the nineties, following NPM approach).  
 
Indeed, it seems that Good Governance techniques occur rather sporadically in CEE in public administration 
(practice), even if that is widely discussed – following the international mainstream – in Public Administration 
(theory). In fact, political transformation of several countries of the region suggest a somewhat different angle of 
change than that of transparency, openness, citizen involvement, cooperation with civil society, deliberative 
decision-making, etc.
18
 What has been going on in countries of former Soviet-Union and even in some Visegrad 
                                                          
15 E.g. Liebert et al. (2013), while refer to the role of NPM and generally Western theories on administration in the region, 
they hardly provide any type of ‘outcome’ indicator as an impact of these. An exception are Nemec et al. (2005) who attempt 
to systematically measure the – as it turns out, rather negative – outcome of contracting out at local level.  
16 Meyer-Sahling (2009a) seems to present this view, presumably as in the field of civil service the dominant explicit 
exogenous expectation was indeed in favor of a merit based system.  
17
 Pollitt-Bouckaert 2004, 2nd ed.. However in the third edition (2011) the authors devised a new concept: New Public 
Governance, that is, as the author can decipher it, is the – governance – part of the 2004 Neo-Weberian concept with the 
Digital Era Governance added.  
18
 Even though, some government documents and declarations like to refer in their terminology to Good Governance, or in 
Hungary Good Government. (The difference is described and emphasized by Stumpf’s paper in this volume.)  
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countries may remind one rather the pre-Weberian (Prussian?) system of administration than anything of 
network governance.  
 
As there have been not much empirical studies, especially not in a positivist sense (measuring quantitatively 
outcomes) on the impact of NPM in the region, there is literally none on the impact of Good Governance. One 
may be somewhat skeptical about the potential success of this approach.
19
 First, civil society, as hundreds of 
policy and research papers emphasize, is week in the region.  Interest of large, typically underprivileged social 
groups are not organized and thus cannot be effectively presented in a deliberative process.
20
 In other words, 
networks may provide a quite unbalanced (unfair) presentation of the society’s needs, wishes and interest. In 
Hungary, for instance, only those civic organizations seem to be relatively strong and well organized that are 
either part of a larger, international network (actually a semi-independent subsidiary of it), or fake-civil 
organizations presenting in fact political parties or large economic interest groups. Another important pre-
requisite of a successful GG approach is the consensus-oriented culture of societies. Countries that seem to 
successfully follow this approach, like Scandinavian countries, may be characterized as consent-oriented cultures 
looking for mutually satisficing agreements. Although without a clear empirical evidence, we can hardly 
consider countries of the CEE region as part of this cultural trait. 
 
Kovac in the introduction of this volume enlists major deficiencies of (or impediments to) Good Governance: it 
requires mature societal subsystems in terms of solidarity and search for common good; it may favor the more 
active, that is more powerful, better organized stakeholders, and it may undermine democratic control due to 
delegation of power and functional interest representation. Taking all these into account, though perhaps not in 
line with Kovac’s opinion, the author has serious doubt about the feasibility and, on the other hand, expediency 
of GG approach in short run in the region.  
 
6.The notion of the Neoweberian State  
 
Neoweberian state (NWS) may be the fourth term whose content should be briefly analyzed in a CEE context. 
As much as it can be traced back, the term popped up in the second edition of the seminal work of Pollitt & 
Bouckaert in 2004 (p. 100) first and further elaborated in the third edition of the book (Pollitt & Bouckaert: 
2011: 118-119). In the original, 2004 version and mostly in the 2011 book too, NWS seems to be an alternative 
reform trajectory followed mainly by Continental European countries not subscribing for the hardcore NPM 
ideology and practice. The new (3
rd
 ed.) interpretation of NWS is somewhat more specific, seemingly leaving 
out governance arrangement from this concept. It seems to be a variant somewhere between Weber and NPM, 
embracing mostly the managerial (as opposed the market-competition) elements of NPM.  
 
NWS gained interest among scholars of government, however much less has been said about that so far, as about 
NPM. A simple search on Google Scholar yields 3,400 hits on ‘Neo-Weberian State’, whereas 659,000 on ‘New 
Public Management’ in the comparable 2004-2013 period. However, if we stick to this rather primitive statistics 
and look for articles containing the term ’NWS’ and ‘Central and Eastern Europe’ together we find that 42% (!) 
of the papers addressing NWS refers in some way to the region as well. The same proportion is only 2.6% in 
case of NPM.  
 
Pollitt & Bouckaert (2011: 120) call the attention to the fact that “the precision of NWS model – or the NPM for 
that matter – must not be exaggerated”. Indeed reading the double list of “Weberian” and “Neo” features seems 
to be a good theoretical frame to identify characteristics of existing administrative systems of Europe. However, 
as a vision inducing PA reform in practice seems feeble and vague. This may be the reason that in several 
countries of the region, such as in Hungary, NWS became a central tenet of government ideology requiring 
“strong state”, centralization as opposed to autonomy and liberal arrangements.21  
 
In other words, while NPM seemed to function relatively well both as a descriptive theory of existing 
endeavors/trajectories as well as a prescriptive-normative scheme to set up general objectives (like less state, 
more business and competition) and methods to reach them (as contracting out, voucher system, PPP etc.) NWS 
does not seem to work well in the latter regard. Even such excellent proponents as Drechsler (e.g. 2005) fail to 
                                                          
19 From the above mentioned two papers (Cieciora) was rather optimistic, based mostly on impressions on a new initiation  
(2014: 94). The other (Kiss 2014) draws a rather pessimistic conclusion based on a study of much wider scope.  
20 Bouckaert (2009: 97) notes that governance-type modernization “in some cases requires civil society to be (re)built”. 
21 See various publications of G. Fodor (in English, 2009), the leading expert of the Hungarian government financed think 
tank (Századvég). An overview of this ideology is provided by Buzogány & Korkut, 2013; Hajnal & Csengődi, 2014.  
Pollitt-Bouckart in the third edition (2011: 119) also refer to interest of CEE scholars on the concept and warn about potential 
misinterpretation.  
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provide us with much practical advice on how NWS in reality would look like. While GG does not really occur 
in practice in CEE, NWS is theoretically difficult to imagine as it appears in practice.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The paper provided a subjective, overly critical, perhaps even skeptical overview of major theories (?), models 
(?), or paradigms (?) of public administration from the past half a century as we learnt about them in 
international (i.e. English-language, typically US origin) literature. The paper also attempted to capture some 
specificities of these theories and the related practice in the post-communist countries or in the CEE region. 
Deficiencies or ambiguities regarding functioning of these models among these particular circumstances were 
also addressed.  
 
Emphasis was on the negative role of major international organizations, most of all the IMF. These organizations 
offered to or rather forced the NPM on CEE countries, in a form of shock therapy for a patient in shock already. 
However, since DiMaggio & Powell (1983; 2012) published their seminal works in the mid-eighties on 
isomorphism we are aware of the fact that organizations like to be similar, to follow the mainstream, the 
fashionable. No doubt this is the case for public administration and this is specifically the case for CEE countries 
where the West has always meant a certain ideal, an objective to reach. This endogenous factor could be as much 
a driving force as it was the exogenous pressure.
22
  
 
It seems that CEE countries at collapse of communism with their completely disqualified government model 
were especially vulnerable to foreign models conveyed by powerful organizations; dominantly coming from 
Anglo-American environment and spreading solutions – as ‘international best practice’ – applied almost 
exclusively in Anglo-Saxon institutional environment. Countries of the CEE region may have been luckier and 
by now better off if the advice came from countries like Germany, France, Scandinavian countries that have 
traditionally been closer to CEE not only in physical distance but in all institutional elements of government. 
These countries formed originally also the ideal for CEE countries.  
 
The ship has gone, but the smoke remained after that.  
 
Most methods enlisted in this paper have no roots in CEE, they may be alien from the social-cultural reality, may 
lack the necessary economic background and cannot fit properly to the way of government functioning. This, in 
turn, inevitably leads to anomalies (Bouckaert, 2009: 101). Foreign advice also increased the confusion in 
governments bombarded by the parallel, frequently contradicting models. Civil servants inevitably faced 
uncertainty caused by the change of political system (where their moral integrity and further employment was 
also questioned), caused by the ultimate uncertainty about government’s size and role and way of functioning. In 
brief, the whole “constructed World” (Berger-Luckmann 1991) of government officials collapsed and no new, 
clear and stable model was provided to adopt and to adapt to.  
 
There has always been a major tension in the CEE region between the somewhat Eastern realities and ‘Western’ 
aspirations; a tension expressed in the term modernization. The main, somewhat pessimistic message of this 
paper that, regarding public administration but perhaps even in a wider perspective, the past quarter a century 
surely has not been an absolute success. The future success may depend on the ability to apply efficient Western 
solutions that are still in accordance with national identity. Probably it is not an exaggeration to state that the 
papers in this book, besides their specific topic address this wider challenge as well.  
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